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1 Introduction
Sierra Leone is one of a number of states that
underwent a period of civil war and collapse after
the end of the Cold War. The international
community has devoted considerable resources to
the reconstruction of these states but often has
found progress very difficult. Typically the focus of
attention has been on restoring the structures of
the central state – the army, the police, the national
bureaucracy – by improving their functioning
and their ability to serve the citizenry. However,
many of these states collapsed not only because
they were not working well but also because they
were exploiting their societies. Furthermore, in
Africa most states have not only a direct
relationship with their citizens as individuals but
also a mediated one through rural governance
systems that usually pre-date colonialism and
may have greater legitimacy than the central
state itself (Mamdani 1996; Oliver and Fage 1966).
These local governance structures generally have
persisted through the collapse and civil war more
successfully than the central state has.
A set of questions thus arises: Has the
international community erred in putting too
much emphasis in reconstruction on building out
and down from the central state? What role has
been and could be played by local governance
structures in recreating order and human
security? How has the governance capacity of
these local institutions been affected by the civil
war? Has the sudden abundance of direct
services from international providers itself
destabilised state–locality–citizen relationships
by adding yet another layer to governance?
To answer these questions this article examines
the experience of Sierra Leone from the start of
its civil war in 1991 through to the present. I have
conducted research on these and related questions
throughout the country since 1996. For the present
study I have supplemented this experience with
a qualitative data set based on unstructured
interviews in 38 communities in 28 chiefdoms in
eight2 of the 12 districts in the country during
2010–11. This excludes preliminary meetings with
various key stakeholders in the Western Area
including key officials in the Ministry of Local
Government and Rural Development Services,
especially the Decentralisation Secretariat,
Ministry of Internal Affairs (especially Senior
Police Officers), a number of former ministers, civil
society groups, legal practitioners and academics,
heads of non-governmental organisations (NGOs),
senior politicians from both the ruling party and
the opposition, retired civil servants, and some
former ex-combatants.
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2 Background
There is a considerable set of literature on the
causes of the Sierra Leone civil war and its
history, which therefore does not need to be
rehearsed again here (Abdullah and Mauna
1998; Gberie 1997; Keen 2005; Peters 2011;
Richards 1998). I summarise only the key points
that are relevant to this analysis. 
The fundamental causes of the collapse of Sierra
Leone were the civil war in Liberia and its export
into Sierra Leone; and in good part the desire to
capture the revenues that were available from its
alluvial diamond deposits/artisanal diamond fields
(as emphasised in Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2000). 
Nonetheless, the movement of the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF) into Sierra Leone was
facilitated by four key features of the weak Sierra
Leonean state: a history of post-independence
patronage and corruption; an army that proved
easily corrupted and tempted by political power;
a corrupt and brutal Sierra Leone Police (SLP);
and the disaffection of many young men with their
local chiefs, whom they felt were denying them
access to the land and resources (and who were
easily recruited by the RUF)3 (Richards 1998).
The civil war began with the invasion of the
country from Liberia by the RUF in March 1991.
It was followed by a succession of coups, peace
accords, elections and peacekeeping missions by
ECOMOG,4 led by Nigeria, the United Nations
(UN), and finally and most successfully by the
United Kingdom in 2000, with the war usually
seen as ending in 2002. The British were
particularly active until 2007 in rebuilding the
Sierra Leone military and police force.
3 Coping with the war
3.1 The impact on human security
The war began in the Eastern Province, gradually
spreading to the South and West and reaching the
North quite late in the conflict. The RUF attacked
not only local officials (especially chiefs) but also
brutally killed, maimed and raped civilians who
attracted the ire of its irregulars. Human insecurity
involves not just stopping attacks on life and limb,
however, but also assaults on resources and
livelihoods on which communities are dependent.
Here too the impact of the war was devastating.
Some communities resisted the rebels, some just
gave in, and others voluntarily joined to save the
destruction of their property and killing of
civilians. The rebels began attacking villages and
desecrating sacred bushes, raping women, and
killing initiators, Paramount Chiefs (PCs) and
lesser chiefs. The communities really protected
their chiefs, however, as they refused to identify
them to the rebels. There were no national or
local police visible (Sierra Leone Police – SLP, or
Native Administration Police – NAP). Sometimes,
the chiefs were allowed to stay in-post and they
agreed because they wanted to protect their
people from the wrath of the RUF. The rebels in
turn used these chiefs to mobilise resources and
get logistics from the community on their behalf.
More usually, however, the chiefs would melt into
the bush with their people or flee to the towns.
3.2 The local response
3.2.1 Civic associations and secret societies 
Despite (or perhaps because of) the devastating
impact of the war on human security, rural
communities remained intact. Food, medicines,
education and physical security were all handled
as a community and approached in a
participatory manner (interactive and
community owned). I encountered one entire
village that walked with its chief from the
Eastern Province to the North, to escape the war
in the former only to find itself unfortunately
engulfed by its movement to the latter shortly
after it got there. 
The pre-war (traditional) leadership structures
continued informally to provide whatever degree
of governance response was possible. 
The elders and us, the youths, agreed on protecting
ourselves by covering our chiefs. So they stayed with us
unrecognised and safe. We lived both in town and in
the bush as situations dictated. When it was too
unpredictable, they went to the bush; when there was
some sanity, they came back and cohabited with them.
Our chiefs were really fully in-charge as they had all
the powers they had during normal times but did so
unnoticed (Youth leader in Nimiyama
Chiefdom, Kono District, 2011).
The survival of chiefdom authority was not
universal. 
The war destroyed the chieftaincy system and most of
the chiefs died. The court system was completely
eradicated and replaced by kangaroo courts presided
over by [militia] commanders (ibid.).
IDS Bulletin Volume 44  Number 1  January 2013 31
However, in the chiefdoms I visited, a third of the
chiefs remained with their people (even if in
hiding) throughout even the most difficult part
of the civil war and most of the rest fled only
briefly. Although a large number of chiefs died
during the war period, their positions were easily
refilled after the war. 
In addition to the chiefs, the main social
structures pressed into service to provide physical
security were the secret societies and the locally
recruited Civil Defence Forces (CDF). These
helped the chiefs to administer the township as
they had moral authority and this was prudently
used to manage discipline and create the
awareness that the chiefs were still responsible
for the maintenance of law and order. The CDF,
other secret societies (the Bondo and Poro) and
other pre-war associations were key in the
reincorporation and improvement in security.
Sierra Leone was blessed with a rich and diverse
associational life before the war broke out: the
secret societies (male – the Poro, the Wonde,5
Gbangbani, Hunting and Ojeh; and female –
Bondo); youth, women’s and farmers’ associations;
football, dance, and social clubs; civil society
groups; cooperative societies; and financial clubs
(using the Grameen model and the Osusu).6
Apart from the secret societies, all other social
groups in the communities broke down during the
war. Nonetheless, this rich associational life did
provide the basis for resistance and order. In
Kambia, for instance, the head of the only civil
society group became the head of the CDF later.
The secret societies were the most popular for
mobilisation – even though initiation did not take
place regularly during the conflict. 
A number of new structures also sprang up during
the war and many persisted: the Hindo-Hindo;7
Mammy Queens (an RUF innovation of village
women’s chief);8 chairmen in refugee and
internally displaced persons (IDP) camps; video,
and motorbike riding9 clubs; cultural groups; the
Sierra Leone Awareness Movement (SLAM);
vigilante groups, the CDFs, and Civil
Development Units (CDUs). The last three were
normally formed in communities as a result of
joint requests from the Sierra Leone Army (SLA)
and chiefs. They therefore had legitimacy in these
communities and commanded some respect. The
Tamaboroh mobilised all the secret societies,
spiritualists, herbalists, the energies of youths,
chiefs, etc. in the chiefdoms and townships. The
Donsos were an integral part of the Tamaboroh.
Some of the heads of these new structures also
acted as chiefs during the war, especially if the
incumbent had died or fled. A few of these
continued even after the war and were respected
because of the way they conducted themselves in
very difficult circumstances.
Before the war, the chiefs had been fully in
charge of conflict resolution and the running of
village activities, including permission to initiate
into secret societies. But avoidance of the
conflicts that had contributed to the war and the
need to involve those who were instrumental to
the survival of their communities now dictate a
more inclusive approach.
The larger towns and cities developed systems to
handle conflicts as committees comprising youths,
women, men and elders who were put in place to
address palavers, protection of the rights of women
and children, and the like. These committees
had powers to recommend to the elders that
people be fined, punished or sanctioned. 
During the war, the CDF and the chiefs ensured
that there was some law and order in their villages.
Ngiema Dama and Blama Town in the East, and
towns and villages in the Liberia boundary area,
are typical examples. They provided security for
all the citizens in their communities. The local
courts, as mentioned earlier, worked on at a low-
key level even during the war. In the North and
some parts of Kono District the RUF proxy
chiefs (G-5) were in charge of discipline in their
communities. They had their committees which
had orders from the commander in the area and
their decisions were final.
3.2.2 Civil Defence Forces (CDF)
Most communities in the South and East created
local militias to defend themselves and/or harass
the RUF invaders. These forces were weaker in
the North and strongest in the South.
The first step came in Kenema Town (in the
Eastern Province), where a group related to the
male Poro secret society sprang up called the
Hindo-Hindo movement. It marked the
beginning of a resistance group that was later
transformed into a larger Kamajor militia
movement, which in turn formed the core of the
CDF in the country. 
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Similar groups in other parts of the country were
Tamaboroh (Koinadugu), Donsos (Kono),
Hunting Society (Western Area) and, in the later
part of the war, Kapras and Gbethiis (North –
Temnes). Local self-defence efforts were built
around these traditional hunters and extended
their training and rituals.
The CDF proper was formed as a result of a
request from chiefs in the Eastern and Southern
regions and all locals were welcome in the
society. It is called a society because it has a secret
to keep, a password which helps to identify
infiltrators and rogue elements, and a vow to
upkeep. Membership was voluntary, not
mandatory. Community voluntary contributions
were solicited to support them. ‘Due to the
ineffectiveness of an army without counter
insurgency training in protecting civilians and
villagers from raids by forest based rebel
guerrillas’ (Muana 1997), with time the National
Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) military
government encouraged all communities to have
vigilantes/CDF to help them identify rebels and
strangers who could be a source of potential
danger to their communities and report to them
or their chiefs. 
After the democratic elections were won by the
Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) in 1996, it too
encouraged the CDF, and President Kabbah gave
them national recognition and made the
coordinator of the CDF – Hinga Norman – the
Deputy Minister of Defence. The government and
the foreign military forces supporting it
encouraged all chiefdoms to form the CDF and the
PCs to be part of the society for the coordination of
logistics. These foreign forces (including
ECOMOG, the Executive Outcomes (Sandline)
from South Africa, the Gurkhas, and the United
Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL))
helped to train the CDF in modern weaponry and
provided them with basic arms and ammunition.
After ECOMOG deposed the second military
government and the army defected to the rebels,
the civilian 
President Kabbah controlled [only] two
separate military actors, the ECOMOG
[largely Nigerian military force] and CDF.
The CDF played a key role in interdicting the
RUF supply lines in the South. This unit
received very little material support from the
government, yet the Kamajor units were
regarded amongst the most effective (though
never completely trusted) force available to
the government (Albrecht and Jackson 2009). 
In the Northern region, the scenario was
completely different. First, the war arrived there
relatively late. Thus the RUF had been able to
study the way the CDF operated and had started
infiltrating the rank and file of the society…
Some [infiltrators] were commanders of RUF
battalions and therefore changed their method
of attacking their targets.10 Second, the SLPP
government was less confident of the loyalty of
the North, so that the CDF (Gbethiis and
Tamaboroh) there was even less well armed than
elsewhere, leaving them with only local weapons
(cutlasses, machetes, slings, etc.). So the RUF
had a fairly easy ride in most of the villages and
towns it attacked.
3.2.3 Social control and CDF abuses
In the early stages of the war the chiefs
controlled those who were recruited into the CDF
and therefore were able to ensure that the local
CDF behaved responsibly toward them and the
communities they were designed to protect. The
condition of such control, however, was that the
chief had to be a member of the CDF. The
Kamajor militia was always part and parcel of the
town community. Systems were put in place to
ensure that those in arms did not take undue
advantage over civilians. As the war progressed,
however, initiators in the hunters’ and secret
societies became indiscriminate in their
recruitment (as the initiates paid them fees) and
chiefs who were not deeply involved in the actions
of the CDF themselves lost authority over them,
with the consequence that these CDF carried out
abuses, especially when they were recruited to
fight in areas away from their homes. But chiefs
retained at least some degree of direction over
71 per cent of the CDF in the areas I visited.
4 Governance in the aftermath
4.1 Leadership for the CDF?
Usually, in the aftermath of a war, those who are
prominent in defending their communities are
able to claim leadership roles within it. But this
has rarely happened in Sierra Leone because of
the abuses that occurred.
Authority was not shifted to the bad ones; instead [in
selecting new chiefs and local councillors] they
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considered those from ruling houses and with good
character. Whatever contribution they could have
made during the war was not a trump card for
chieftaincy. The bad guys were in fact stigmatised,
ostracised and some have also been sanctioned not to
be considered for leadership positions in the
community. Sometimes they have also been asked to
leave indirectly as they could not feel convenient
[comfortable] with the treatment they received from the
community members, including their own family.
Some have faced mob justice and were also harassed by
us for their role in the war (Giema Dama,
Kenema District in the Eastern region).
Elsewhere the chiefs and their subjects said: ‘We
do not recognise all those who in one way or the
other made us suffer in the hands of the RUF or
in their own hands’. They were rejected by
communities and not given the opportunity to
seek any office in the chiefdom or township. 
4.2 Restoration of the chiefs
Even though grievances against some of the chiefs
had led some young people to join the RUF, the
institutions of chieftaincy were still quite popular
and were easily and universally re-established after
the war. In only 19 per cent of our study
communities was there any challenge to the return
of the traditional chiefs at the end of the war.
Despite the uniformity of the outcome, restoration
varied according to the conditions of the local
conflict. In many places the RUF had created their
own version of a Native Administration (NA)
system. Kono District was a special case as they
were specifically targeted by the best-trained
rebels because of the diamonds and gold found in
the district. The rebels therefore overran the
district and had a government with proxy chiefs
(Mammy Queens and male G-5s). 
The chiefs after the war took over with no resistance
from any quarter. They had a meeting which was more
or less a peace talk with all those who worked as chiefs
in their stead and ensured that they worked together
for a while before formally retaking power and the
RUF proxy chiefs gave up voluntarily to the chiefs
(Communities in Bo, Moyamba, Bonthe,
Pujehun, in the South and Kenema, Kailahun
and Kono in the Eastern region). 
In the North, however, very few communities had
a peaceful transition, most of the chiefs had to be
removed by either force of arms (UNAMSIL,
SLA and the CDF) or the people refusing to
recognise their authority.
The rebels in areas where the CDF were active
did not occupy the seats of the PC, so transition
to the larger political order was smooth. This was
the case in all the chiefdom headquarter towns
in Moyamba, Pujehun, Bonthe (Rutile),
Kailahun, and Koinadugu.
In some of these places, the CDF had assumed de
facto control in the absence of the chiefs. In other
communities the chiefs worked collaboratively
with the RUF/CDF for some time (i.e. the PCs
used the CDF to enforce laws). Immediately
after the war, the central government started
reintroducing the local government system by
sensitising the people in the communities about
re-establishing the councils, and later conducted
council elections and trained personnel to staff
the various offices. The government brought in
some civil servants (on secondment to act as
Chief Administrators) and installed the chiefs as
members of the newly constituted councils.
Blama was a hot spot during the war because of
its strategic location on the main highway
between Bo and Kenema (two provincial cities)
and a few kilometres from Baojibu and Tongo
fields (two diamond fields and therefore a route
that leads to Kono – the home of Sierra Leone’s
diamonds). The chiefs therefore did not have the
opportunity to rule without interference during
the war. They did not run away into the bush
permanently but went in and out as and when
there was peace. This notwithstanding, they did
not have difficulty linking up with the central
government as they managed to maintain their
links with the district administration and central
government. There was no contest to the powers
of the chiefs once the war was declared over.
In cosmopolitan cities like Bo and Kenema, they
had no problem with restoration as the civilian
administrations were in charge, even during the
peak of the war. Bo City was in fact home for all
52 chiefs in the Southern Province. All the chiefs
had to do was to return to their homes/
communities and take over from the CDF who
had been acting as community leaders whilst their
chiefs were away in Bo. In both Bo and Kenema,
the government had provincial administrators in
place throughout the war and they were quite
functional in organising the CDF and other
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developmental programmes in the region. In the
East it was slightly different, as some of the chiefs
(especially the section and town chiefs) stayed
with their people and fought the rebels, as most of
these were well-trained hunters and so knew their
terrain better than anyone.
Once again, it is surprising that the institution of
chieftaincy was so easily restored when its
performance had been one of the grievances that
led young men to join the RUF. One of the
factors in the restoration, obviously, was the
abuses conducted by the young in the RUF and
many of the CDFs, delegitimising those who
might have opposed it. 
Another factor was the fact that many chiefs
died during the prolonged disruption of the war,
so that some of those who were considered
abusive were no longer alive. Sensitisation by
NGOs and government played a big role in
giving the communities hope about replacements
of their dead chiefs. Government also facilitated
the process of electing the PCs by involving the
Independent National Elections Commission
(INEC) in conducting all PC elections in the
country. In Bo District for instance, there were
15 chiefdoms with PCs and only two survived the
war, both very old.11
The secret societies12 started initiations once
more and this encouraged the young men and
women to come back as they were key in their
lives (they had missed the initiation and dancing
for about nine years). The men’s secret society
especially was useful in organising the young
men into groups to help protect the town from
the few roaming militias. 
Finally, during the war, chiefs made a major
change to include youth and women in their
governance practices. (The one RUF innovation
that has survived the war has been their creation
of the role of Mammy Queen in all communities.
This survival doubtless also has been aided by
the considerable emphasis on women’s rights by
most of the international assistance and
peacekeeping actors.)
4.3 The implications of local government reforms
Despite the restoration of the chieftaincy and its
general popularity, there are four other signs
that the SLPP government was concerned about
its lack of broad responsiveness before the war.
First, elected district councils from the early
independence period have been reintroduced.
Although the Paramount Chiefs are represented
on the councils, the elected Ward Councillors
and District Chairmen give chiefs competition
for leadership. Second, chiefs also have to share
their revenues with the councils, which both find
a major problem and source of tension. In fact in
94 per cent of the areas I visited there was
significant conflict between the chiefs and their
district councils. Third, initially the prefectorial
District Officers (DOs), who had been the link
between the PCs and the central government
were made only officers of their councils, which
also weakened the influence of the chiefs.
Fourth, the magistrates’ courts have been extended
and are more accessible. The magistrates may not
be incorruptible, but the Native Administration
judges/chairmen are believed to have been worse,
as all of their income is derived from the fees and
fines they impose and as their practices are much
less restricted by the law and formal procedures,
which Sierra Leoneans now seem to value more
than they did in the colonial period.13 In the
present day, most communities are using
alternative dispute mechanisms created by donors
to resolve conflicts as they are still afraid of the
very high fines that the court chairmen used to
levy for common disputes between and within
families and households in their communities.
The consequences of the four changes and the
preceding tensions are that the post-war chiefs
seem to be more moral leaders than
authoritative decision-makers and are much
more responsive to their communities. But this
has left both the NA and the district councils
functioning poorly. Chiefs are not a wholly
undemocratic institution in Sierra Leone. All
local taxpayers participate in their election, and
women as well as men are chosen for these
offices. Nonetheless, they must be selected from
among the descendants of the locality’s founding
families and they hold office for life. In exiting
the war Sierra Leone has seemed to respond to
conflicting imperatives – to build on the
institutions that have traditional legitimacy, and
to provide for more democratic and reliably
responsive local governance. This tension does
not yet seem to have been finally resolved. 
It would appear, however, that the move to
democratic decentralisation has stalled, quite
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possibly for partisan reasons, and that the
influence of the chiefs is again on the rise. The
district councils were abolished in the early
independence period by an All People’s Congress
(APC) government and the APC recaptured the
presidency in 2007. Currently eight out of the
19 councils consider themselves as SLPP
councils,14 whilst the 11 remaining councils are
branded APC. Even so, this majority does not give
the APC the degree of central control that
de-concentration through the DOs and PCs
would have provided. Perhaps for this reason, or
perhaps for financial ones, further devolution is
now stalled. Only 48 of the 84 Statutory
Functions and Instruments available for
decentralisation have been devolved to the
councils to date. 
5 Security sector reform
Some of the government forces forcibly
recruited, school-age boys were conscripted, and
women were raped. This left a big gap between
the forces and the people they were supposed to
protect as it destroyed confidence, trust and hope
in the capacity of these forces to protect them
from external aggressors.
5.1 The Sierra Leone Army
Before the war, communities had respect and a
fairly good relationship with most of the Sierra
Leone Army (SLA). The SLA was trusted when
the war started as people saw them as saviours
trying to repel the rebels when they made their
first advances to towns and cities. This later
changed when the CDF started working with the
SLA and discovered that some of the attacks on
towns and villages were organised by
collaborating soldiers (later called ‘sobels’).15
This dented the cordial relationship that had
existed between the civilians and the SLA.
Matters became even worse when most of the
SLA broke with the civilian government and
joined the RUF in open rebellion. The
consequence was that after the British
intervention a wholly new force was recruited.
The army was retrained initially by the British
Military Assistance Training Team (BMATT)
and later by the International Military
Assistance Training Team (IMATT). All training
facilities were facilitated and led by the UK
Department for International Development
(DFID). Security Sector Reform (SSR) has since
been treated as a governance issue and also
multilevelled to ensure the participation of all
community members. 
SSR played an important role in improving on the
internal and external security of communities in
particular, and Sierra Leone in general. The
project changed the face of security from being
looked at as a number of separate entities
managed only by uniformed men and women, to
one where all players saw themselves as a team. 
SSR introduced the Office of National Security
(ONS) with a Coordinator that ensured that
security was brought to the doorsteps of the
people in their various communities. A Central
Intelligence and Security Unit (CISU) was created
to gather information and process it before
forwarding it to the ONS via its Coordinator who
then takes it to the National Security Council
(NSC), which meets at least once in a month.
Provincial Security Committees (PROSECs) and
District Security Committees (DISECs) were set
up and Coordinators appointed to staff the
offices in the provinces. The DISECs met weekly,
and passed on information to the PROSECs who
met biweekly and the PROSECs then sent these
pieces of information to the National Security
Coordinator for the information of the NSC. The
PCs were key members of these committees as
they brought in information from their people at
the lowest level of governance. 
Approximately 40% of the population in each
district were aware of the existence of the
DISECs and PROSECs and their role in
collecting security information. This is [an]
impressive statistic given the complete failure
of the intelligence structure before and during
the war. There is no doubt that not only have
significant improvements taken place within
the Security System transformation process,
but also that they have been noticed and
appreciated by local population across a range
of districts. Whilst problems still remain,
the… greater visibility of the ONS at local
level contributed to the general population
feeling more secure (Albrecht and Jackson
2009: 194, 197).
The reputation of the SLA has been almost
completely restored. They have even started
taking part in peace missions throughout the
world, especially in Sudan. 
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5.2 The Sierra Leone Police
The national police also were subject to a major
Security Sector Reform initiative, again with
British leadership. In this case, the reform
involved a restructuring of an existing cadre, not
its replacement. Before the war the SLP were
hardly present in the rural areas at all, leaving
most real rural policing to the NA police. 
Before the war, we then had both the SLP and Native
Administration Police (aka NA Gbadda) in our
midst. The NA Police were more active and present as
the PCs were very active and determined to defend
their chiefdoms because they had the authority with
very little political interference. All conflicts were
resolved in the NA and very few serious cases went to
the SLP as their presence was not really felt and the
people had more trust in their chiefs than the police.
We only took conflicts like arson, wounding with
aggravation and very serious crimes like murder to the
SLP, as they would intimidate the complainant and
the victim (Mixed group interview with chiefs
and youths in Hangha, Kenema District, 2011).
The SLP was the state actor that we had the least
relationship with, as they used to intimidate community
members in pre-war SL. During the war, the SLP were
targeted in communities as they fell out with people
and as a result were targeted by the youths and the
rebels alike. They were hardly seen as they lost their
credibility before the war and this was the situation
till the end of the war (Youths during a Focus
Group Discussion in Bo City, Bo District, 2010).
The prolongation of the conflict affected and
demoralised all the loyal forces (SLP, SLA, the SL
Prisons and SL Fire Forces) as they were the first
to be targeted, humiliated and killed in the town
square whenever the rebels took over a town.
The war ended the rule of law, human rights, and
the authority of all the three tiers of governance
(central, local and native). As a result, all the
local structures were destroyed, some sacred
society bushes and shrines completely desecrated,
and barracks vandalised, with some completely
destroyed. 
SLP’s reputation, however, has been reinstated
with the UK DFID-led Security Sector Reform
Project (SSRP) as they have now been retrained
and new officers recruited. Some amount of
change is now visible, even though the element
of corruption is still rife in some junior ranks.
Thus the people have now accepted the SLP and
are working very amicably with them in their
communities. At the end of the war, both the
SLA and the SLP by association learnt how to
relate well with civilians and at the same time
maintain security in communities. It made them
realise that they could still make their fortune in
the military and police if they could reform their
ways. They also saw the way the foreign and
international forces treated the community to
get information that enabled them to succeed.
As a part of SSR, Local Needs Policing (LNP)
was also introduced in all the divisions. As early
as 1998 in the 
very early stage of the police reform process,
the future policing doctrine of the Sierra
Leone Police was first defined as Local Needs
Policing, which has guided police reform to
this day. In its basic form, Local Needs
Policing was defined as: ‘Policing that meets
the expectations and needs of the local
community and reflects national standards
and objectives’ (Albrecht and Jackson 2009).
Another aspect of SSR of the SLP was the Family
Support Unit (FSU), which started as a Domestic
Violence Unit (DVU) in 1999 after the invasion
of Freetown, to handle problems between the
ex-combatants and their combat wives,16 and was
soon replicated in all the 26 divisions of the SLP
throughout the country. This also helped provide
an avenue for women and children to report
matters of violence and neglect to the SLP. They
were staffed by experienced investigators
seconded from the Criminal Investigation
Department (CID) of the SLP.
The consequences of SSR are that the SLP are
much improved coming out of the war. But
unlike the SLA it would be a mistake to say that
they have been wholly transformed. 
Presently we are cautiously working with the SLP as
they have been retrained and given some logistics. There
are quite a number that have [played] terrible tricks up
till now. They are still chasing money and given unfair
judgement in the police stations (Youths in Rokupr
Magbema Chiefdom and Kawula–Masungbala
Chiefdom, Kambia District, 2011). 
The problem is not just one of police practice but
also presence. The SL government tried to
reconstruct these barracks and build a few new
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ones in strategic locations which were identified
as volatile/grey areas in some district
headquarter towns. But some villages up to now
still do not have proper police stations, posts or
cells. This has slowed down the government’s
effort to redeploy the various forces and is still
continuing to slow the pace at which justice can
be accessed by all in the country. 
The SLP was still absent or barely present in many
of the areas I visited. It was most present in the
East and very weak in its presence in over half of
the North. Even where the SLP is present in the
rural areas its numbers are weak. Given these
realities one would think that it is really important
for the SLP to be supported in their local work by
the NA Police. But there is no national provision
for their pay and the chief ’s source of revenue is
now being shared with the district councils.
The word tribal as a prefix to describe the NA
Police sounds a little odd but it does perform a
basic task and that is, during the days of the
colonial master, most of the PCs had to employ
and train trustworthy men to provide security for
the community. They were led by a Sergeant
Major who was a powerful officer/man in the
chiefdom. He had powers to order the arrest of
anyone thought not to be working in the interest
of the chiefdom. NA Police officers collected
taxes, fees and licences, and carried out arrests
and summons and fines on behalf of the court
chairman. This continued until the start of the
war in 1991 when their powers started dissipating
as the ruling government started maltreating all
those PCs they felt were not supporting their
government/party. This broke the dynamics in the
chiefdom administration and rendered the PCs
less effective. The social contract between the
chiefdom administration and their subjects was
somehow broken and this is affecting the security
sector support system in the chiefdoms.
The point here is that SSR of the policing
function in Sierra Leone has been incompletely
conceived and executed. Not only have
insufficient numbers of incompetent and corrupt
police been replaced in the SLP to create the kind
of thorough reform that was accomplished with
the SLA, but the NA rural base for policing was
ignored, is starved for support and now rarely
functions properly. SSR cannot be accomplished
from the capital alone; community institutions
have to be supported or changed as well.
6 Multilayered and networked governance
A society engaged in conflict and then emerging
from it will be subject to networks of relationships
by a variety of international actors with its
multiple levels of government that are even
more critical, fluid and complex than those in
the normal state. The question is not whether
significant international influences exist in these
circumstances but what their implications are for
the long-term governance of the society.
6.1 The security sector
The first and most obvious place to begin is with
those actors directly involved in military operations.
The RUF rebellion was ultimately defeated, and
their brutality meant that almost none of the
insurgent institutional innovations survived it.
The impact of the international forces that
assembled over time to defeat the rebellion has
been more lasting. At first these were mainly
regional forces from Guinea and Nigeria which
came on a bilateral military pact; later,
ECOWAS decided to send in an intervention
force, these two armies were transformed into
ECOMOG, with additional troops from Mali,
Senegal and Ghana, under Nigerian command.
Later the NPRC contracted the South African
Mercenaries Executive Outcomes (Sandline) to
help protect the diamond fields in Kono District
and Tongo in Kenema District. These
contributed immensely in training and equipping
the CDF. The ECOMOG forces too worked
hand-in-hand with civilians. 
The transformation in the Nigerian Army
contingent after its absorption into the UN force
(UNAMSIL) brought about a marked difference
in the behaviour of the Nigerian soldiers, as their
mandate changed and they began operating
under the Geneva Convention. This taught the
SLA multiple lessons, including that the military:
a could be respected if it protected and respected
the civilians it was supposed to defend; 
b must be a disciplined, law-abiding and stable
institution; and
c are democratically subordinate to the civilians
in power. 
After this period, the Nigerian contingent also
encouraged dialogue between and within
communities, and the training their officers
offered to the SLA was the beginning of
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professionalism in the state actors (SLA and SLP
especially) and their realisation that they must
respect the principles of democratic governance. 
The mixture of soldiers from all over the globe
allowed people to see the way different military
men behave in warfare, not only African forces
but also Asian ones from Bangladesh, Pakistan
and India as well as the Gurkhas. The British
forces also came with permission of UNAMSIL
but operated with a long-standing bilateral
arrangement and mandate with Sierra Leone.
The peacekeeping missions in Sierra Leone had
an impact on the security sector reform process as
they were an inspiration to the SLA and SLP,
seeing their contemporaries from neighbouring
states and other African countries coming in to
train them and monitor their performance and
behaviour. The police too saw the role of the
civilian police in the UN international force.
Above all it gave the SLA and SLP some hope that
if they behave and measure up to international
standards, they too might be drafted into the
various peacekeeping missions in the world.
6.2 Governance
Democratisation remained a consistent theme of
international community pressure on Sierra
Leone throughout the civil war and after. This
included international pressures for a free and
fair presidential election in 2007. Outgoing
President Kabbah was under great pressure from
his SLPP to overrule the victory of Ernest Koroma
of the APC. A united and networked international
community (including even China and Iran)
persuaded Kabbah to abide by the Electoral
Commission’s vote count (Leonard et al. 2009).
The donors also ensured that the decentralisation
process took off, and then guided the process for
a while by having consultants hired to train
council officials and monitor the process. In this
way multilevelled network governance was
reintroduced in the country after 24 years in
limbo (under a virtual one-party state).
Dramatic international influence on women’s
rights also was evident by the conclusion of the
war. I have already noted the infusion of gender-
sensitive policing into the SLP. The need to
consult with women and to be more attentive to
their rights also was quite evident in my
interviews with multiple chiefs throughout the
country. Indeed the only RUF institutional
innovation that survived the war was the creation
of the community office of Mammy Queen for
women’s issues.
6.3 Local development
During periods of conflict local institutions of
governance will be more important and there
will be more international donors and
peacekeepers, who will intervene more widely
with greater consequence. Throughout the war
the international community’s humanitarian relief
dealt with the multiple other aspects of
wellbeing that contribute to human security,
broadly considered. A large number of bilateral
and multilateral donors, and a range of UN
agencies played a key role. They also networked
with communities to support small initiatives
through international non-governmental
organisations (INGOs) and national NGOs. 
The degree of networking with external actors
varied from one community to the other. Some
village communities especially in the East
(Kenema, Kailahun) and South (Bonthe –
Moriba Town and Rutile) had no networks with
external actors but used their local networks in
the nearby villages to cope during the difficult
periods of the war. Messages were passed and
received by utilising bypass roads. Some people
had the luck of relating well with the various
militias and armies (fighting forces) that took
over their villages and towns for a while. 
A few communities had refugee and IDP camps
near them and these camps were of tremendous
help as the NGOs that serviced them also provided
them with some assistance/projects as a host
community. In parts of the Southern region, for
instance, the people from the surrounding small
villages abandoned them and came to the largest
town/chiefdom headquarter towns, for example
Koribondo in the Jaiama Bongor Chiefdom on
the main Bo–Liberia highway. In this case, the
only external actors they networked with were
NGOs (Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Africare
and the SL Red Cross) in the Bo axis.
In Bo (Southern Province) networks and linkages
were established and maintained with NGOs, as
they were and are still, their main source of
development aid. Merlin, Care, World Vision,
Concern Worldwide, ActionAid, Africare, GTZ
(Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische
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Zusammenarbeit – German Agency for Technical
Cooperation) and a host of INGOs were and
remain quite visible in the Bo environ. The city
council is also networking with donors and
financial institutions globally (DFID, World
Bank, Islamic Development Bank (IDB) and
African Development Bank (ADB)). The INGOs
were quite handy during the peak of the war as
they were the main network of organisations that
the people looked to for their survival. 
In Kono (Eastern Province), descendants of the
Kamara Chiefdom in the diaspora organised and
sent used clothing, money, food and medicines.
Individuals and groups volunteered and liaised
with the government of Sierra Leone to get
logistics for the forces. A new group called
MOCKY (Movement of Concerned Kono Youth)
sprang up and played a big role in setting up
networks and linkages with NGOs, foreign
governments and donors at large. The Paramount
Chiefs in exile in Europe and the USA also used
information received from their villages and
chiefdoms to solicit help from donors and well-
wishers.
Other areas like Jaiama Sewafe had very few
networks with other people or external actors as
their villages are not close by – in fact they are
all poles apart – so tried to work within their
communities, practiced the barter system, and
helped each other when in need. The youths
were in charge of facilitating such activities in
their communities since they could not access
help from NGOs and the government.
In the Northern Province, the scenario was
different as communities networked with
relatives within and around neighbouring
villages and chiefdoms, and through linkages in
Guinea and Freetown. They also reintroduced
and utilised the barter system to break the
barrier of currency exchange and to facilitate
networking, as there was an acute shortage of
physical cash in the region. This was the case in
the Koinadugu (Kabala, Yagala, and Bafodia),
Bombali and Kambia Districts, especially in
those chiefdoms that are near the Guinea border.
Coordination was effective within and around
nearby societies. Some chiefdoms like Wara
Wara Bafodia in Koinadugu District are still not
benefiting from interventions by the district
council or intervention from NGOs (as has been
the case since independence). 
As the war wound down, NGOs also played a key
role, as they supported food production, provided
health services, helped build shelters and
rehabilitate community structures, and so on.
Supporting NGOs and agencies included
Medicines Sans Frontières (MSF), the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), Care International, World Vision, the
Evangelical Fellowship of Sierra Leone (EFSL),
Red Cross, Medical Emergency Relief
International (MERLIN), Caritas and ActionAid,
with the help of donors and multi- and bilateral
development partners. The government (SLPP in
this case) put mechanisms (DDR and NaCSA)17
in place to handle issues like schools, health
centres, Court Barry reconstruction,18 etc.
There were very few national NGOs in the
country when the war started. They only started
appearing in the mid-1990s when the INGOs
needed to intervene in remote communities
where they were not allowed to go for security
reasons. They started as community-based
organisations (CBOs) and later, with the help of
the INGOs, some transformed into NGOs. Very
few of these NGO/CBOs, however, grew and
their capacities were not built by the INGOs.
The extent to which the war created large
numbers of unmediated relationships between
international actors and villagers has been seen by
some analysts as a barrier to state reconstruction:
‘Overall, the international community has played
a positive role. The big problem is that its very
success detracts from the legitimacy of the
government’ (Kaldor 2006). For a variety of
reasons this fear probably is exaggerated. A
careful study of this issue in Kenya, where there is
a huge density of INGOs and NGOs, found that
the state is usually credited for their activities and
that government actors most often are involved
with what they do (Brass 2010). Similar dynamics
can be observed in Sierra Leone.
First, the relationships between international
actors and village governance structures in most
cases were institutional ones, not too strong and
therefore infrequent. Second, the internationals
compete against one another, as do the
communities themselves, which weakens the
quality of the relationships and their influence.
From time to time, INGOs had problems between
themselves because of this competition for limited
resources in the international community. This
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sometimes confuses the recipients and creates an
unhealthy environment within the communities
they support. Third, local citizens do not know how
to access donors. Even though they are well aware
of their existence and resources, INGO and NGO
programmes and priorities are highly specialised
and difficult to understand or access from the
bottom. Finally, of course, as the war wound down
so did donor involvement. After the war, there was
a glut of INGOs in the cities which slowly and
surely moved into the rural communities servicing
them from the cities. This situation is changing as
only a few can now be seen around, each handling
a particular area of specialisation. 
The consequence of the foregoing four factors is
that after 2002 the main external actors most
communities interacted with were the
development agencies and the local councils that
were newly reintroduced in 2004. It thus appears
that the formal national and district structures
of governance are much more influential for
locals in accessing the donor and NGO networks
than might have been imagined, given the
tremendous financial advantage of the
internationals. The communities simply do not
have the direct contacts or knowledge to recruit
international finance for local priorities.
Thus communities expect to access assistance –
even from donors or INGOs – through the state
or their elected representatives. Nonetheless, as
shown above, the role and functioning of the
district councils is not secure and the
relationship of national Members of Parliament
to their communities, now that there are district
councillors, also is unclear. 
Most MPs do not go to their constituencies as
decentralisation has made them uncertain of what
they can deliver. In some cases the constituents do
not even know them now and are desirous to
remove them in the coming elections in November
2012. For some, if they do go to their
constituencies, they do so primarily to challenge
the councillor on the implementation of
development projects within the constituency/ward. 
Most of the district councillors do go to their wards
but councils lack significant development funds at
the moment. Only a few of the councillors grasp
the role that they could play in mastering and
interceding with the complex structure of
international development assistance.
For the three tiers of centre, district and
chiefdom/ward to work, the government must be
ready to devolve still more functions to the
council and also provide or transfer to them
more of the funds that the donors send via the
Ministries to the councils as this is the main
stumbling block in their way. 
The resulting quality of the chiefs’ relations with
their various elected representatives and central
government officials is generally mediocre and
82 per cent have contact with no more than two
of them. The institutional and financial
instability of the councils and the chiefs, rather
than the density of international assistance,
seems to be the real barrier to responsive local
governance. 
7 Conclusions
Life without the state is always ‘nasty, brutish
and short’ (Hobbes 1939 [1651]). During the war
Sierra Leonean men were killed at will and their
properties looted. Their wives and children were
raped in their presence and they did not have the
right to question anything. If they did, the
punishment was summary execution. 
The social contracts between society and the
state, communities and their chiefs, and chiefs
with the centre, have been re-established in
Sierra Leone – especially in the rural areas. In
good part this is due to the powerful negative
lesson of what the alternative represents.
Even the youths in the mining fields of Kono
prefer state control and peace. But they do feel
that their chiefs only hear them during difficult
periods like the war. ‘Sometimes we prefer
statelessness because in this situation we are
considered in any meeting as they would need
our support’ (Youth Chairman in Tombodu,
Kamara Chiefdom, Kono District, 2011). 
As the foregoing quote suggests, the recovered
legitimacy and effectiveness of Sierra Leone’s
government structures is not just a product of
negative learning. It also is due to a far-reaching
set of reforms to the key institutions of order in
the country – the Native Administration, the
SLA, the SLP and the magistrates’ courts, and
the district councils.
However, there are tensions that will need to be
addressed: 
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i Security Sector Reform of the SLP is insecure
and needs to be reinforced. 
ii Chieftaincy seems to be an institution in
transition. Is it going to persist only as a source
of moral leadership, unifying the communities
it serves? Or is it going to undergo changes
that would make it more compatible with the
universalist and democratic ethos that has
grown in Sierra Leone from the war? 
iii The tension between the chiefs and the
district councils seems a potential source of
weakened legitimacy. The re-establishment of
District Officers adds further uncertainty.
Since there seems to be partisan advantage in
the DO development, the instabilities here
are potentially great. 
iv The various reforms that have come in the
wake of the civil war are incomplete and the
institutional boundaries of the newly
reconstructed multilayered governance
system are unclear. The result is that most of
the component parts – chiefs, district councils,
NA and magistrates’ courts, SLP and NA
Police, are not functioning as well as they
might. Not enough attention has been paid to
how governance at the ‘periphery’ is to be
conducted.
Multilayered, networked governance involving
international actors also is a reality but it is
much less of a threat to vital states than might
have been imagined. States have influence over
what donors do, that is much greater than the
imbalance in resources would suggest. Citizens
are unaware of the true depth of donor influence
and give legitimacy to the state for donor
presence, and generally can only access donor
resources through the state.
It is clear that governance does not disappear
when the state collapses. Its structures remain
hidden and in retreat, but ready to sprout into
existence again. This is true for all parts of
government, but it is especially true for the
structures of local and rural governance. The
consequence is that a post-conflict state has
much more need for decentralisation – as well as
possibilities for achieving it.
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Notes
1 An extended report on the research discussed
in this article can be found in Vincent (2011).
2 The districts are: Eastern Province: Kenema
and Kono; Northern Province: Bombali,
Koinadugu and Kambia; Southern Province:
Bo, Bonthe and Moyamba. See also map at
end of report (Vincent 2011).
3 The denial of land was not necessarily absolute,
for it was not always scarce. In Moyamba
District, for example, youths had access to up to
3 acres (1.2ha) of land to plant annual and
biennial crops (generally for subsistence) but
not perennials (which therefore precluded the
more lucrative cash crops such as oil palm,
cocoa or coffee, which would effectively give a
long-term claim on the land). In the Kono and
Tongo areas, chiefs were very mindful about
allocating long-term use-rights to land that may
hold diamonds or gold and preferred to give
young people parcels of land that were either
barren or had been mined for several years. 
4 ECOMOG (the ECOWAS Monitoring Group)
is the armed wing of the Economic Community
of West African States – the regional
organisation comprising 16 states (both
anglophone and francophone countries) in West
Africa with headquarters in Nigeria. Individual
countries contribute troops whenever there is a
crisis in any of the 16 states. The UN, USA, UK
and some other European countries provide the
bulk of the operational costs for their
deployments and logistics. 
5 This is the equivalent of the Poro society in the
rest of Mende land. It has a fairly different
approach to initiation with a very strict social
order/contract and unique names/titles. 
6 Osusu is the local name for Rotational
Savings and Credit Associations (RoCSAs).
7 The Hindo-Hindo was a password that was
used by the Kamajors in the initial stages of
the war when they were mobilising. Closely
related to the male secret society, Hindo
generally means ‘man’.
8 ‘Mammy Queens’ are female chiefs appointed
during the war. They were not elders during
normal times.
9 The riding of motorbikes was another creation
of the war. The riders are generally referred
to as Okadas, a borrowed word from Nigeria.
10 They would come into a town (or village or
city) that they wanted to attack and settle in
with the indigenes for a while in order to learn
their customs and traditions, their hiding
places (Sokoihun), the various routes to enter
and escape from the town, which houses had
CDF members (the active commanders), note
the types and quantities of weapons they had
in a particular location, and ascertain the
direction from which possible reinforcement
could come to help repel any attack, etc.
11 Chief Hindowa of Baaja Chiefdom and Chief
Gbenga.
12 The secret society refers to the Bondo/Sande,
Poro, Gbangbani, and the Wonde. 
13 A similar shift in popular sentiment from NA
courts toward the magistrates’ ones is evident
in Ghana (Crook et al. 2010).
14 Bo City, Bo District, Pujehun District, Bonthe
District, Moyamba District, Kenema City,
Kenema District and Kailahun District.
15 This term refers to soldiers who connived with
the RUF and were described as ‘soldiers by day
and rebels by night’.
16 Women were initially taken as sex slaves after
attacks on communities but later considered
by senior combatants as wives, therefore
referred to as combat wives.
17 The National Commission for Social Action
(NaCSA) handled rehabilitation, reconstruction,
resettlement and reintegration. Disarmament,
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) was
set up to handle ex-combatants.
18 Court Barry is a court house in all chiefdoms
where the chiefdom court chairman sits his
court session and the Paramount Chief also
holds chiefdom meetings.
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